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STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-3-102(3)0) (West 2008) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order of the Second Judicial District Court in a civil case 
wherein the court granted a motion for summary judgment. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-3-102(3)0) (West 2008). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."1 "A district 
court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed for correctness, with no 
deference afforded to the district court."2 The facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom are viewed "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."3 
Issues Presented for Review 
Issue #1: Whether, as a matter of law, landlords may immunize themselves against 
liability for harm caused by their own negligence through an 'exculpatory' clause in a 
residential lease 4? This issue was preserved below. (R. 706). 
Controlling Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions 
None. 
1
 . Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found, 2008 UT 13, f 11, 179 P.3d 760, 764-65. 
2
 Id 
3
 Id 
4
 The only issue on appeal is the validity of the 'exculpatory' clause from a public 
interest or public policy perspective. Accordingly, Appellants will be collectively 
referred to as Canyon Cove. 
1 
Statement of the Case 
Canyon Cove Apartments first caught fire on December 4, 1981. (R. at 496). 
Canyon Cove again caught fire on April 18, 1994. (Id.). The fire in this case is now the 
third such occurrence resulting in significant property and personal damages, including 
the death of one resident. (R. 1-6 and 19-22). Appellants, referred to collectively as 
Broderick, brought this action alleging , inter alia, negligence because Canyon Cove 
knew of the fire history yet failed to adequately maintain the smoke detectors/fire alarms, 
failed to maintain fire extinguishers, failed to keep doors shut and automated Tire doors' 
maintained which would have prevented or slowed the spread of the fire, and allowed an 
abandoned couch to remain in a stairwell. (R. 1-6). The couch ultimately provided the 
fuel source for the fire. 
Fact discovery during the case suppoted the allegations. Following the fire, an 
inspection revealed multiple fire detectors that were either missing or not working. (R. 
278). Inspection also established that Canyon Cove Apartments had nonfunctioning fire 
doors and nonworking smoke detectors. (R. 287). Many of the smoke detectors emitted 
a light "beep" indicating that the batteries were dead or dying. (R. 917). During the 
course of the fire in this case, one tenant opened the door to her apartment and the 
hallway was so filled with smoke that she could not see. (R. 914). However, the tenant 
heard no fire alarms going off. (R. 914). Another tenant also testified that she could not 
hear fire alarms even as the fire was spreading. (R. 918). 
2 
The couch, the fuel source for the fire, had been abandoned and left in a stairwell 
for up to two weeks. (R. 496, 917). Several of the tenants complained about the couch 
being in the stairwell. (R. 917). If the couch had not been left in the stairwell, there 
would not have been this fire. (R. 272). The fire spread easily due to Canyon Cove's 
lack of due care in this case. In part, the fire spread due to the proximity of the couch to 
the stairwell. (R. 277). Additionally, some of the magnetic doors meant to close 
automatically in the case of a fire were not working. (R. 277). Simply keeping the 
stairwell doors closed would have helped prevent the fire from spreading up the stairs 
(like a chimney) and into the attic where a lack of fire stops further allowed the fire to 
spread throughout the entire building in a very short time. (R. 496). By leaving the doors 
open, oxygen was able to further fuel the fire and contribute to the spread. (R. 272). 
Broderick asserted a cause of action against Canyon Cove for their negligence. 
(R. 001-006). Broderick claimed that Canyon Cove negligently: "knowing about the 
prior fire failed to take any measures to reduce or eliminate that hazard; failed to have an 
intact and working fire alarm system; and, failed to keep the stairwells free of burnable 
materials." (R. 003). Canyon Cove sought summary judgment against Broderick's 
negligence cause of action. (R. 475). The district court denied the motion for summary 
judgment on the negligence claim. (R. 624). 
However, aware of the previous fire (R. 83, ^ f 9, and R. 478-479), Canyon Cove 
had required tenants to sign a lease which included a "Limited Liability" clause. (R. 
645-648). This exculpatory provision provided: 
3 
Owner will not be liable for any damages or losses to person or property caused by 
any Resident or any other person including, but not limited to, any ... crimes. 
Owner shall not be liable for personal injury or for damage to or loss of Resident's 
personal property (furniture, jewelry, clothing, etc.) or Resident from fire ... or 
negligent behavior of Owner or its agents unless such injury or damage is caused 
by gross negligence of Owner or its agents. 
(R. 839)(emphasis in original). Canyon Cove then sought summary judgment under this 
'exculpatory clause.' (R. 642). Canyon Cove argued that Broderick "signed a release 
that was clear and unequivocal, waiving any claims of negligence against defendant." (R. 
643). Canyon Cove also argued that, because the fire was intentionally started on the 
abandoned couch, the 'crimes or fire' portion of the clause also prohibited Broderick's 
claims in their entirety. (R. 832). Broderick countered that exculpatory provisions 
contained within a residential lease violate public policy. (R. 706). The district court 
agreed with Canyon Cove, granting the motion for summary judgment. (R. 1052-1054).5 
Summary of the Argument 
An 'exculpatory clause' shields a party from liability for harm caused by their own 
negligent conduct. As a result, exculpatory clauses directly undermine the incentive to 
act with reasonable care for the health, welfare and safety of others. Tenants, often those 
with the least financial power, must accept a unilaterally incorporated exculpatory clause 
thereby shielding the landlord against any claim. Housing, properly considered, 
5
 Although Canyon Cove argued dismissal on the basis of crime, fire, or negligence, 
the Court order reflects only dismissal for damage "caused by acts of (1) crime; or (2) 
fire;" (R. 1053, «| 2). It appears that the 'negligence' was inadvertently dropped as the 
sentence in f^ 2 is not punctuated correctly. For purposes of appeal, Appellant agrees that 
this is simply a scriveners error and that all three provided the basis for trial court's 
decision. 
4 
represents a fundamental need for everyone. Landlords control the common areas as well 
as much within the individual leasehold itself with only a right of occupancy falling to 
the tenant. Eliminating the liability of a landlord based on exculpatory language 
ultimately increases risk exposure for those with the least power to protect themselves 
from harm through no wrongdoing of their own, while protecting the individual who 
brings that harm about. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IMMUNIZING THE LANDOWNER AGAINST THEIR OWN 
NEGLIGENCE ELIMINATES A LANDLORD'S INCENTIVE TO ACT 
WITH REASONABLE CARE. 
A. Landlords Must Use Due Care to Keep the Premises Reasonably Safe. 
Utah courts recognize that "landlords have an affirmative, common law duty to 
exercise reasonable care in all circumstances."6 A "landlord is bound by the usual 
standard of exercising ordinary prudence and care to see that premises he leases are 
reasonably safe and suitable for intended uses."7 Accordingly, landlords must answer 
"for injuries caused by any defects or dangerous conditions which he created, or of which 
he was aware, and which he should reasonably foresee would expose others to an 
unreasonable risk of harm."8 Here, the district court denied Canyon Cove's motion for 
Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 R2d 570 (Utah App. 1994). 
Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah 1978). 
Id. 
5 
summary judgment, finding that the "undisputed facts presented to the Court are 
inadequate to conclude that [] Canyon Cove was not negligent." (R. 624). 
The duty of landlords to exercise reasonable care stands on a simple principle: 
because the landlord is the one in control, the landlord must act to see that safety prevails 
over danger. "The landlord is [] under a [] duty of reasonable care to make conditions 
reasonably safe to maintain those parts of the structure which remain in his control but 
are needed for the safety or protection of the leased premises."9 Dispite this policy based 
common law duty, the trial court immunized Canyon Cove under the terms of the 
exculpatory provision. 
R Exculpatory Clauses Immunizing A Landlord's Obligation to Exercise 
Reasonable Care Undermines the Safety and Welfare of the Public. 
Where exculpatory provisions prohibit liability for negligence, this Court 
invalidates the provision should it infringe on public policy. Hawkins v. Peart invalidated 
a 'pre-injury' exculpatory provision. The provision at issue in Hawkins, similar to the 
provision here, attempted to immunize the Defendant against claims based on the 
Defendant's own negligence. Specifically, the provision required a mother to 
'indemnify' the Defendant for "any claims, demands, and actions or causes of action on 
account of death or injury ... without regard to the negligence ... of [Defendant.]"10 The 
release for recreational horse back riding contained this combined exculpatory and 
indemnity provision. Hawkins recognized that "most courts allow release of liability for 
9
 Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1985)(citation omitted). 
10
 Hawkins ex rel Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 UT 94, \ 1, 37 R3d 1062, 1063. 
6 
prospective negligence, except where there is a strong public interest in the services 
provided."11 Ultimately, the court held "that public policy renders void the indemnity 
agreement between Navajo Trails and Hawkins's mother."12 
When determining whether public policy or public service voids an exculpatory 
clause, Hawkins and several other Utah decisions cited with approval Tunkl v. Regents of 
Univ. ofCal.13 Tunkl surveyed the case law at the time and arrived at a "rough outline" of 
the factors which typically cause invalidation of exculpatory clauses.14 In Berry v. 
Greater Park City Co., Utah courts adopted the Tunkl 'factors' as the means for 
evaluating exculpatory clauses. Although Utah courts previously considered warranty 
of habitability issues in the residential lease context, it does not appear that any decision 
directly addresses the ability of a landlord to insulate themselves against liability for their 
own negligence. 
The only Utah case touching on similar issues in the landlord context, P.H. Inv. v. 
Oliver, addressed the specific question as to whether there may be an implied waiver of 
the warranty of habitability. Importantly, the issue in Oliver required deciding whether 
"the tenant waived any [warranty of habitability] defense or cause of action by agreeing 
11
 Id. at ^  9 (emphasis added). 
12
 Mat t 18. 
13
 See, Hawkins at ^  9. See, also, Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 2008 UT 13, f 17, 
179 P.3d 760; and, Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, f 15, 171 P.3d 442. 
14
 Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. ofCal, 383 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1963). 
7 
to rent the premises in their deteriorated condition."15 By contrast, this case involves the 
landlord's wholesale insulation from liability for their own negligence tlirough boilerplate 
language in a nonnegotiable residential lease agreement. The warranty of habitability, 
either by statute or at common law, certainly supports public policy considerations which 
weigh against enforcement of exculpatory provisions in residential leases. However, 
much broader public interests also caution against shielding landlords. 
Public policy or public interest concerns generally operate to void residential lease 
provisions prohibiting claims for negligence against the landlord. Even before the Tunkl 
decision, courts recognized that "the comparative bargaining positions of landlords and 
tenants in housing accommodations ... are so unequal that tenants are in no position to 
bargain; and an exculpatory clause which purports to immunize the landlord from all 
liability would be contrary to public policy."16 Following Tunkl, courts employed that 
analysis to arrive at the same conclusion: exculpatory provisions in a residential lease 
violate public policy. 
In Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., the landlord sought to escape liability for 
injury or damage "no matter how caused."17 The court then used the six criteria set forth 
in Tunkl to find the exculpatory clause contrary to public policy.18 Specifically, the court 
observed that (1) residential leases are increasingly the subject of governmental 
15
 P.K Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1019 (Utah 1991). 
16
 Kuzmiakv. Brookchester, Inc., I l l A.2d 425, 432 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955). 
17
 Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465, 467 (Cal. 1978). 
18
 Id. at 468. 
8 
regulation; (2-3) a lessor of residential property provides shelter, a basic necessity of life 
and this offer is generally made to all members of the public; (4) the parties to a 
residential lease have unequal bargaining strength; (5-6) a residential lease does not make 
any provision whereby the tenant can pay the lessor additional fees for protection against 
the lessors negligence.19 Finally, gathering case authority at the time, the court observed 
that in holding "exculpatory clauses in residential leases violates public policy, this Court 
joins an increasing number of jurisdictions."20 
In Crawford v. Buckner, the court found that an exculpatory clause in a residential 
lease "deprives the tenant of the right to recover damages for harm caused by the 
landlord's negligence by releasing the landlord from liability for future acts of 
negligence."21 The Crawford court applied TunkVs six factors to the exculpatory clause 
in a residential lease and reached the same conclusion that such clauses are void as a 
matter of public policy. The court concluded that "by definition a residential lease places 
the person and the properly of the tenant under the control of the landlord, subject to the 
risk of carelessness by the landlord and his agents."22 
Importantly, the court rejected any attempts by the defendant landlord to 
characterize the matter as a "purely private affair"23 and invalidated the contract on public 
19
 Mat 468-469. 
20
 Id. at 469-470. (citations omitted). 
21
 Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 755-56 (Tenn. 1992). 
22
 Mat 758. 
23
 Id. 
9 
policy grounds. Crawford recognized residential rental property involved the rights of 
potentially thousands of tenants. The court also premised its conclusion on the fact that a 
residential landlord is "engaged in performing the service of great importance to the 
public."24 
Utah courts have also expressed similar concerns regarding the lack of control by 
tenants and unequal bargaining power, factors which lead to invalidation of exculpatory 
clauses in the residential lease. Williams v. Melby, noted that tenants today have "little 
interest in the land 30 or 40 feet below, or even in the bare right to possession within the 
four walls of his apartment.5'25 Similarly, in Oliver, the court held "[b]ecause of a lack of 
bargaining power, low-income tenants often have no meaningful choice but to accept and 
continue to live in substandard housing."26 
Hawkins cautioned that enforcing an exculpatory clause "may remove an 
important incentive to act with reasonable care."27 Exculpatory clauses imposed in a 
unilateral manner offer no genuine bargaining and the party seeking to use such a clause 
"simply evades the necessity of liability coverage," shifting the risk of harm solely to 
another party. Placing this Court's prior concerns next to the Tunkl factors, it becomes 
readily apparent that a landlord may not insulate themselves from harm done as a result 
of their own negligence. Residential lease exculpatory clauses immunizing the landlord 
24
 Id 
25
 Williams v. Melby, 699 R2d 723, 727 (Utah 1985)(citation omitted). 
26
 P.H. Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah 1991). 
27
 Hawkins, 2001 UT 94,112. 
10 
from liability for their own negligent acts violates public policy and must be stricken 
down. 
Finally, Canyon Cove may attempt to argue that, regarding factor number six of 
the Tunkl factors, the individual tenants could have purchased their own insurance. 
However, both Tunkl and this Court recognized that not each and every one of the six 
criteria must be met.28 Each factor standing on its own provides a basis upon which 
invalidation may occur. Furthermore, no facts of record demonstrate that the tenants 
could obtain insurance in this case. Indeed, given the history of fires it may well be that 
individual tenants, who lacked control over the common areas or fire suppression, would 
be entirely incapable of obtaining such insurance. Canyon Cove, as the party seeking 
summary judgment, bears the burden of demonstrating that such insurance was available. 
CL 'Crimes' or Tire9 Language Cannot Circumvent Liability for 
Negligence Which Brings About the Crime or Fire. 
Nor does the existence of "crimes" or "fire" language in a residential lease operate 
to preclude a claim against a landlord for negligence. Specifically, a landlord can be held 
liable in 'negligence' for creating the conditions which make either a fire or criminal act 
possible or which increase the harm from a fire or criminal act. Case law, generally holds 
landlords held liable when they fail to exercise reasonable care with regard to a crime. 
For example, in Romero v. Twin Parks Se. Houses, Inc. the court held "[ljandlords have a 
28
 See, Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445 (invalidity for violation of public policy "involves a 
transaction which exhibits some or all of the following characteristics."); and, Berry, at ^ 
13 ("the activity at issue need exhibit only a sufficient number of Tunkl characteristics 
such that one may be convinced of the activity's affinity to the public interest."). 
11 
common-law duty to take minimal precautions to protect tenants from foreseeable harm, 
including a third party's foreseeable criminal conduct."29 The "rule [requiring a landlord 
to exercise reasonable care] encompasses within its general ambit injuries sustained by 
tenants as a result of criminal acts committed by others in the common areas within the 
landlord's control."30 
The landlord's duty is not to prevent the crime which brings about injury or harm, 
but to take steps which minimize the occurrence of the crime or the damage which 
results. In Rivers v. Hagner Mgmt. Corp., the plaintiff brought a claim for injury 
following a fire set by a serial arsonist. The trial court dismissed the claim. The 
appellate court overturned the dismissal, finding that "[a]s we see it, apipellees and the 
circuit court misapprehended the nature of appellant's claim, which was not based on a 
duty, if any, to prevent the arsonist from setting the fire, but rather on a duty to maintain 
the Property so as to minimize the danger to its occupants from fires that might occur."31 
Canyon Cove cannot escape their own negligence and the consequences which 
flow from that negligence. Exculpatory clauses in residential leases which immunize a 
landlord work to the detriment of safety. A landlord, freed of any deterrent effect for 
negligent actions, might no longer take reasonable steps to provide a safe environment. 
Landlords control the majority of their property, with very little left that the residents can 
Romero v. Twin Parks Se. Houses, Inc., 895 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (App. Div. 2010). 
Scott v. Watson, 359 A.2d 548, 552 (Md. 1976). 
Rivers v. Hagner Mgmt. Corp., 959 A.2d 110, 128 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008). 
12 
29 
30 
31 
change. Common areas themselves are wholly outside the realm of a tenant's power. 
Additionally, exculpatory clauses shift the burden to the weaker party in a transaction 
necessary to secure housing in our society. Those who cannot qualify for a mortgage are 
also those least likely to have the means necessary to take any steps to protect 
themselves. 
Because the lease provision offends public policy, the summary judgment granted 
by the trial court should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
Exculpatory clauses operate to the detriment of all the public, not just tenants who 
have no choice but to accept them. First, the clause removes an important deterrent, 
liability, for the failure to act with reasonable care. Next, the clause shifts that burden to 
individual tenants who lack control over the property and who, in any event, either cannot 
obtain liability insurance for the property at issue or cannot afford such insurance. 
Finally, because there is likely no liability coverage, an exculpatory clause ultimately 
shifts the costs of harm from a landlord's negligence back onto the public at large who 
pay for any consequences due to a lack of reasonable care. Upholding exculpatory 
clauses in residential leases serves no useful purpose. 
DATED this day of September, 2010 
Attorney for Appellant 
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